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ABSTRACT. Convenient assumptions about qualitative properties of the intertemporal utility function
have generated counter-intuitive implications for the relationship between atemporal risk aversion
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the intertemporal utility function is additively
separable then the latter two concepts are the inverse of each other. We review a simple theoretical
specification with a long lineage in the literature on multi-attribute utility, and demonstrate the
critical role of a concept known as intertemporal risk aversion or intertemporal correlation aversion.
This concept is the intertemporal analogue of a more general concept applied to two attributes of
utility, but where the attributes just happen to be the time-dating of the good. In the context of
intertemporal utility functions, the concept provides an intuitive explanation of possible differences
between (the inverse of) atemporal risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We
use this theoretical structure to guide the design of a series of experiments that allow us to identify
and estimate intertemporal correlation aversion. Our results show that subjects are correlation averse
over lotteries with intertemporal income profiles, and that the convenient additive specification of
the intertemporal utility function is not an appropriate representation of preferences over time. 
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1 Backus, Routledge and Zin [2004] provide a masterful review of the avowedly “exotic” preferences
developed to consider this issue. We do not evaluate these alternatives, although in section 5 we discuss their
methodological differences with the present approach.
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Convenient assumptions about qualitative properties of the intertemporal utility function
have generated counter-intuitive implications for the relationship between atemporal risk aversion
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the intertemporal utility function is additively
separable then the latter two concepts are the inverse of each other. To explain the apparent lack of
substitutability of consumption between periods one is led to assume a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, implying absurdly high levels of atemporal risk aversion. This is no technical side
issue: untangling it is central to the general understanding of savings behavior (e.g., Hall [1988]), the
analysis of insurance decisions by extremely poor households in developing countries (e.g.,
Townsend [1994]), and the behavior of asset prices over time (e.g., Hansen and Singleton [1983]).1
In section 1 we review a simple theoretical specification which actually has a long lineage in
the literature on multi-attribute utility, and demonstrate the critical role of a concept known as
intertemporal risk aversion or intertemporal correlation aversion. This concept is the intertemporal
analogue of a more general concept applied to two attributes of utility, but where the attributes just
happen to be the time-dating of the good. In the context of intertemporal utility functions, the
concept provides an intuitive explanation of possible differences between (the inverse of) atemporal
risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In section 2 we use this theoretical structure to guide the design of a series of experiments
that will allow us to identify the core parameters of the latent structural models. We also discuss our
specific experiments, conducted throughout Denmark in 2009 using a representative sample of the
adult Danish population.
In section 3 we review econometric models used to estimate the core parameters of the
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models. Section 4 contains basic results.
Our results show that subjects are correlation averse over lotteries with intertemporal
income profiles, and that the convenient additive specification of the intertemporal utility function is
not an appropriate representation of preferences over time. We show that correlation aversion
contributes significantly to the overall risk premium that characterizes risky intertemporal profiles.
1. Theory
Assume that intertemporal utility is defined over the present atemporal utility of money in
some sooner time period t, denoted X, and the present atemporal utility of money in some later time
period t+J, denoted Y.  Let x# and X# denote the magnitudes of money associated with the elements
of X, such that x# < X#, and let y# and Y# denote any elements of Y such that y# < Y#. Let x be a typical
element of X, so that it can represent either the present atemporal utility of x# or of X#, and let y be a
typical element of Y in the same sense. We use this notation device of x and y to make it apparent
that the issues are more general than the application to intertemporal utility, as important as that is
by itself. Thus, in general, think of x and y as two goods, or two attributes of some good.
Define the lottery " as a 50:50 mixture of {x, Y} and {X, y}, and the lottery $ as a 50:50
mixture of {x, y} and {X, Y}. So " is a 50:50 mixture of bad and good outcomes in time t and t+J,
and good and bad outcomes in the two time periods; and $ is a 50:50 mixture of all-bad outcomes
and all-good outcomes in the two time periods. These lotteries " and $ are defined over all possible
“good” and “bad” outcomes.
If the individual is indifferent between " and $ we say that he is intertemporally neutral
towards correlated payoffs in the two time periods. If the individual prefers " to $ we say that he is
intertemporally averse to correlated payoffs: it is better to have a given chance of being lucky in one
of the two periods than to have the same chance of being very unlucky or very lucky in both
2 Several studies note that the core concept appeared as early as de Finetti [1952], but this was written
in Italian and we cannot verify that claim.
3  Everything we say about intertemporal risk aversion or intertemporal correlation aversion applies
symmetrically to behavior that exhibits intertemporal risk loving or intertemporal correlation loving.
4 Harvey [1993] explicitly uses the concept of multiattribute risk aversion to restate formal conditions
used to characterize a wide class of empirically tractable, additive multattribute utility functions.
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periods. The correlation averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs across periods, just as
the risk averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs within periods. One can also view the
correlation averse individual as preferring to avoid correlation-increasing transformations of payoffs
in different periods. 
Keeney [1973] defined this concept as conditional risk aversion, Richard [1975] defined it as
bivariate risk aversion, and Epstein and Tanny [1980] defined it as correlation aversion.2 Since we
interpret the two attributes as referring to different time periods, we call it intertemporal risk
aversion or intertemporal correlation aversion.3  There are direct parallels in the older literature on
multi-attribute utility (Fishburn [1965], Keeney [1968][1971][1972], Meyer [1972] and Pollack
[1967]): in fact, there is more than just a parallel logic, as the motivating example from Richard
[1975; p.13] illustrates.4 There are also parallels in the older literature on multivariate risk aversion
(Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974], Rothblum [1975], Duncan [1977] and Karni [1979]), as
demonstrated by Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger [2007] and Dorfleitner and Krapp [2007].
The correlation neutral individual has additive preferences over time-dated money flows, and
the correlation averse individual has non-additive preferences over time-dated money flows. Let
U(X, Y) denote the intertemporal utility function. Richard [1975] demonstrated that a necessary and
sufficient condition for correlation aversion was that M2U/MxMy be non-positive. The decision-maker
that is correlation averse can be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking in terms of atemporal payoffs
defined over x or y. These concepts therefore break the connection between atemporal risk aversion
5 If the temporal attributes are perfect substitutes, and the discount factor is 1, then there is only
atemporal risk aversion.
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and intertemporal risk aversion.5
Following the exposition of Bommier [2007], we can define a number of important concepts
using this structure. The marginal rate of substitution between money in periods t and t+J can be
defined as
MRS t, t+J = (MU/Mx)/(MU/My) (1)
The coefficient of relative risk aversion in period t can be defined by
RRA t = !x [M2U/(Mx)2] / (MU/Mx) (2)
and a similar definition in period t+J as
RRA t+J = !y [M2U/(My)2] / (MU/My) (3)
The (direct) elasticity of substitution between money in periods t and t+J is
F t,t+J = {1/x(MU/Mx)+1/y(MU/My)} / {a + b + c} (4)
where
a = ![M2U/(Mx)2] / (MU/Mx)2 (4N)
b = 2 [M2U/(MxMy)] / [(MU/Mx)(MU/My)] (4O)
and c = ![M2U/(My)2] / (MU/My)2 (4“)
Finally, a coefficient of correlation aversion with respect to money flows in periods t and t+J can be
defined as
D t, t+J = !2 [M2U/(MxMy)] / [MU/Mx + MU/My] (5)
Clearly D t, t+J $ 0 if M2U/MxMy # 0, since MU/Mx $ 0 and MU/My $ 0, connecting this coefficient to
the definition of correlation aversion proposed by Richard [1975].
With these concepts defined, there is a remarkable relationship between them noted by
Bommier [2007; Proposition 1]:
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1/F t, t+J (1+MRS t, t+J x/y ) = (RRA t + x/y MRS t, t+J RRA t+J ) ! D t, t+J x (1+MRS t, t+J) (6)
From (6) we see formally that correlation aversion breaks the nexus between the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and atemporal relative risk aversion. If we allow J to get arbitrarily small,
and assume that the only difference between the typical elements x and y is in the discount factor,
then as the discount factor goes to 1 it is reasonable to assume that x • y,  RRA t • RRA t+J, and
MRS t, t+J • 1. Then (6) collapses to
1/F t, t+J • RRA t ! D t, t+J x (7)
and further to
1/F t, t+J • RRA t (8)
when D t, t+J = 0 and the individual is correlation neutral or intertemporally risk neutral. Expression
(8) reflects the nexus between atemporal risk attitudes and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
that has frustrated generations of macroeconomists for decades (and led them to do “exotic”
things). Expression (7) makes it clear that (6) breaks that nexus, and builds a conceptual bridge
between the two concepts. The exact quantitative relationship between atemporal risk attitudes and
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution when Jo0 depends on more than D t, t+J and x, but can be
evaluated in specific cases.
Consider some parametric functional forms for the atemporal and intertemporal utility
functions. The most widely used model of intertemporal choice was developed by Ramsey [1928]
and widely popularized by Samuelson [1937], and proposes that the intertemporal utility function at
time t=0 is written as:
U(x, y) = 1/(1+*)t u(x#) + 1/(1+*)t+J u(y#) (9)
where u(x#) and u(y#) are the atemporal utilities of money at each time period, and * is the exponential
discount rate. The variable x# is the magnitude of the monetary payment, while x is the element from
the attribute choice set X, such that x / Dt u(x#); similarly, y / Dt+J u(y#). This notation allows us to
6  See Epstein and Zin [1989], Farmer [1990], Weil [1990], and Bommier and Rochet [2006] for a
discussion of alternative specifications of the inter-temporal utility function and implications for inter-
temporal risk aversion. The specification in (12) can generate negative discount rates unless we assume that
r<1 and 0<1 to ensure that *>0. This assumption is empirically innocuous, as we demonstrate later with
estimated parameter values in Section 3. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] add background
consumption T to a CRRA specification of atemporal utility and apply the function u(x#) = (T+x#)1!r/(1!r),
where u(T)>0. They show that this function is well behaved when the intertemporal utility function is
additively separable, in the sense that the addition of background consumption is a sufficient condition to
avoid negative discount rates. However, adding background consumption to experimental income is
problematic in the estimation of the non-additive function in (12) because one has to specify the atemporal
utility of background consumption at every point in time and not only when the sooner and later payments
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move back and forth between the general multiattribute specification and our particular application
where the attributes are just time-dating. This specification assumes that intertemporal utility is equal
to a weighted sum of atemporal utility flows, where the weights are determined by the discount rate.
Let the atemporal utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification:
u(x#) = x# 1!r/(1!r) (10)
u(y#) = y# 1!r/(1!r) (11)
for r…1, where r is the CRRA coefficient, assumed for simplicity to be the same for periods t and
t+J. With this functional form, r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes risk aversion, and
r<0 denotes risk seeking behavior, all defined over atemporal tradeoffs in t or t+J. 
The specification of inter-temporal utility in (9) is additively separable, which implies that the
inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is equal to the coefficient of atemporal risk
aversion. This assumption is made of convenience and is popular in models of inter-temporal
choice.
A simple extension of the additively separable model in (9) is to consider a CRRA
specification of the inter-temporal utility function:
U(x, y) = [1/(1+*)t u(x#) + 1/(1+*)t+J u(y#)](1!0)/(1!0) = [ > ](1!0)/(1!0) (12)
where 0 is the inter-temporal relative risk aversion parameter (0…1), and the expression [ > ] is useful
below.6 This utility function is separable but not additive when 0…0, and collapses to (9) when there
are made.
7 See Deaton and Muellbauer [1980; p.137] for a discussion of strong separability and additive
preferences. 
8 This is one point where the notational difference between the attribute x and the value x# helps. Recall
that x / Dt x# and y / Dt+J y#.
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is intertemporal risk neutrality at 0=0. The monotonic transformation of (9) into (12) implies that
the intertemporal preferences are additively separable, but the intertemporal utility function is no
longer additive.7 
Given the parametric structure we have assumed, we can restate the marginal rate of
substitution between money in periods t and t+J using (1) as
MRS t, t+J = Dt x#!r / (Dt+J y#!r) (1N)
the relative risk aversion in period t using (2) as
RRA t = ( 0/[ > ] ) Dt x# 1!r + r, (2N)
the relative risk aversion in period t+J using (3) as
RRA t+J = ( 0/[ > ] ) Dt+J y# 1!r + r, (3N)
the (direct) elasticity of substitution between money in periods t and t+J using (4) as
F t, t+J = 1/r, (4OO)
and finally the coefficient of correlation aversion with respect to money flows in periods t and t+J
using (5) as
D t, t+J = {( 20/[ > ] ) Dt+J y#!r Dt x#!r} / {Dt+J y#!r + Dt x#!r}, (5N)
where Dt = 1/(1+*)t. Hence, D t, t+J is positive (negative) when 0 is positive (negative). The specific
functional forms for these concepts will vary with the parametric assumption assumed, of course.
If we again allow J to get arbitrarily small, and assume that the only difference between the
typical elements x and y is in the discount factor8, then as the discount factor goes to 1 it is
reasonable to assume that x • y,  RRA t • RRA t+J, and MRS t, t+J • 1, then equation (5N) collapses to
9  Keeney [1977] illustrates this in a one-on-one, conversational elicitation with a decision-maker.
These lottery comparisons are used to justify the use of a correlation-neutral mutiattribute utility function, and
not to elicit the degree of correlation aversion. Delquie and Luo [1997] show how one can test for the tractable
correlation-neutral class of functions using only two indifference judgements, rather than the set of lottery
comparisons that can be used to estimate the extent of multiattribute risk aversion.
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D t, t+J = 0(1!r)/(2 x#). (5O)
The coefficient of correlation aversion is further reduced to
D t, t+J = 0/(2 x#) (5“)
if r = 0. In this special case the coefficient of correlation aversion is a function of the inter-temporal
relative risk aversion parameter, 0, and income in the two time periods. The inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution goes towards infinity when the atemporal relative risk aversion parameter, r, goes
towards 0, which is just to say that income in the two time periods become perfect substitutes, and
hence the coefficient of correlation aversion is no longer a function of r. In this case relative risk
aversion, RRA, is simply 0. 
To elicit inter-temporal risk aversion one would have to present subjects with choices over
lotteries that have different income profiles over time.9 Proper identification of inter-temporal risk
aversion (0) thus requires that one controls for atemporal risk aversion (r) and the individual
discount rate (*). The three are intrinsically, conceptually connected as a matter of theory, unless one
makes strong assumptions otherwise. Our experimental design and econometric logic follow from
this theoretical point.
2. Experiments
There are several critical components of experimental procedures that need to be addressed
when eliciting choices over time-dated monetary flows. Some are behavioral, and some are theory-
driven. These components guide the specific experimental design we developed.
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A. Essential Characteristics of the Experiments
The first consideration is the importance of the tradeoffs being presented in a transparent
manner to subjects, rather than as a jumble of different principal amounts, horizons, front end
delays, and implied interest rates. The “multiple price list” procedure for discount rate choices that
was proposed by Coller and Williams [1999] is an important advance here. In this procedure the
individual gets to choose between a list of options that provide a principal at some sooner date, and
a larger amount of money at some future date. The list is ordered in increasing order of the larger
amounts of money, to make it easy for the individual to see the tradeoffs. The intuitive aspect of this
presentation is that no subject would be expected to defer payment for the first rows, where the
implied return is negligible, but that every subject might be expected to defer in the last rows, where
the implied return is large. Of course, “negligible” and “large” are in the eyes of the decision-maker,
but annualized interest rates of less than a percentage point or more than 100 percentage points
would be expected to generally fit the bill.
The second consideration, and related to the need to provide a cognitively transparent task,
is the provision of annualized interest rates implied by each alternative. In many countries such rates
are required to be provided as part of a regulatory requirement for most consumer loans, but one
might also provide them in order to avoid testing hypotheses about whether individuals can calculate
them concurrently with the effort to elicit their preferences. On the other hand, there are many
settings in which real decisions with real consequences in the future do not enjoy the cognitive
benefit of having implied annualized rates displayed clearly: for example, decisions to smoke, eat bad
foods, engage in unsafe sex, have children, get married or divorced, and so on. Again following
Coller and Williams [1999], we evaluate the provision of annualized interest rates as a treatment and
study its effect on decisions.
The third component is to control for the credibility of payment. This is addressed in large
10 Another argument is many, if not all, choices that involve future consequences naturally have a
front end delay. Hence the front end delay is not as artefactual a procedure as one might initially think.
Although this is true, it is not the case for all such choices.
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part by using payment procedures that are familiar and credible, and wherever possible by adding
some formal legality to the contract between experimenter and subject to pay funds in the future.
Coller and Williams [1999] and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2010] used promises to pay by a
permanent faculty member that had been legally notarized; Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] and
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] conducted experiments under the auspices, and
actual letterhead, of a recognized government agency. One device for controlling for credibility,
albeit at some cost in terms of identifying certain discounting models, is to employ a front end delay
on the sooner and later payments: one argument for this procedure is to equalize the credibility of
future payment for the two dated payments used to infer discount rates.10 On the other hand, some
would argue that the credibility of payment is one component of the “passion for the present” that
generates non-constant discounting behavior, and that it should not be neutered by the use of a
front end delay. Moreover, and critical for the present design, if the non-constancy occurs primarily
within the front end delay horizon, then one might incorrectly infer constant discounting simply
because the design “skipped over it.” In our design we therefore want to consider as a treatment the
use of a front end delay or not.
The fourth component is to control for the atemporal utility of time-dated monetary flows.
All experimental designs prior to Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] assumed that utility
was linear in experimental income, and defined discount rates in terms of monetary flows instead of
utility flows. This assumption had been clearly recognized earlier, such as in Keller and Strazzera
[2002, p. 148] and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue [2002, p. 381ff.], but the importance
for inferred discount rates not appreciated. A direct application of Jensen’s Inequality to (12) shows
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that a more concave atemporal utility function (10) and (11) must lower inferred discount rates for
given choices between the two monetary options. The only issue for experimental design then is
how to estimate or induce the non-linear utility function. The approach of Andersen, Harrison, Lau
and Rutström [2008a] was to have one experimental task to identify the utility function, another task
to identify the discount rate conditional on knowing the utility function, and jointly estimate the
structural model defined over the parameters of the utility function and discount rate. Thus the
general principle is a recursive design, combined with joint estimation of all structural parameters so
that uncertainty about the parameters defining the utility function propagates in a “full information”
sense into the uncertainty about the parameters defining the discount function. Intuitively, if the
experimenter only has a vague notion of what r is in (10) and (11), then one cannot make precise
inferences about * (or 0) in (12).
The existing literature suggests that the front end delay and the correction for non-linear
utility are the most significant treatments in terms of their quantitative impact on elicited discount
rates. Coller and Williams [1999] were the first to demonstrate the effect of a front end delay; their
estimates show a drop in elicited discount rates over money of just over 30 percentage points from
an average 71% with no front end delay. Using the same experimental and econometric methods,
and with all choices having a front end delay, Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] estimated average
discount rates over money of 28.1% for the adult Danish population. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2008a] were the first to demonstrate the effect of correcting for non-linear utility; their
estimates show a drop in elicited discount rates of 15.1 percentage points from a discount rate over
money of 25.2%. These results would lead us to expect discount rates around 10% with a front end
delay, with a significantly higher rate when there is no front end delay.
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B. The Experimental Design
Subjects are presented with three tasks. The first task identifies individual discount rates, the
second task identifies atemporal risk attitudes, and the third task identifies intertemporal risk
attitudes. We use tasks with real monetary incentives. Observed choices from all three tasks are then
used to jointly estimate structural models of the discounting function defined over utility.
Individual Discount Rates
Individual discount rates will be examined by asking subjects to make a series of choices
over two certain outcomes that differ in terms of when they will be received. For example, one
option can be 3000 kroner in 1 month, and another option can be 3300 kroner in 13 months. If the
subject picks the earlier option we can infer that their discount rate is below 10% for 12 months,
starting in 1 month, and if the subject picks the later option we can infer that their discount rate is
above 10% for that horizon and start date. By varying the amount of the later option we can identify
the discount rate of the individual, conditional on knowing the utility of those amounts to this
individual. One can also vary the time horizon to identify the discount rate function, and of course
one can vary the front end delay. This method has been widely employed in the United States (e.g.,
Coller and Williams [1999]), Denmark (e.g., Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]), and Canada (e.g.,
Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette [2005]).
We ask subjects to evaluate choices over several time horizons. We consider time horizons
between 2 weeks and 1 year. Each subject is presented with choices over four time horizons, and
those horizons are drawn at random, without replacement, from a set of thirteen possible horizons
(2 weeks, and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 months). This design will allow us to obtain a
smooth characterization of the discount rate function across the sample for horizons up to one year.
We also over-sampled the first three horizons, since this very short-term is clearly of great
11 The shorter horizons were each chosen with probability 2/16 = 0.125, compared to the 1/16 =
0.0625 probability for each of the others.
12 See Loewenstein and Prelec [1992; p. 575] and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue [2002, p.
363] for statements of the magnitude effect.  Scholten and Read [2010] claim that the magnitude effect “... is
probably the most robust anomaly in intertemporal choice.”  We evaluate this treatment in Andersen,
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2011b] and conclude that it is not.
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significance for the alternative specification. Hence each subject was twice as likely to get a horizon
of 2 weeks, 1 month or 2 months as any of the later horizons.11
We also varied the time delay to the early payment option on a between-subjects basis:
roughly half of the sample had no front end delay, and the other half had a 30-day front end delay. It
would be possible to consider more variations in the front end delay, but we wanted to keep the
treatment as sharp as possible before examining the tradeoff. Similarly, we varied the provision of
implied interest rates for each choice on a between-subjects basis, and independently of the front
end delay treatment. We also varied the order in which the time horizon was presented to the
subject: either in ascending order or descending order.
Another treatment, to examine the “magnitude effect” that suggests that exponential
discounting is more prevalent with larger stakes, is to vary the principal.12 We employ two levels of
the principal on a between-subjects basis, again to assess the significance of the hypothesized fixed
monetary cost of delay.
These four treatments, the front end delay, information on implied interest rates, the level of
the principal, and the order of presentation of the horizon, result in a 2×2×2×2 design. Roughly
1/16 of the sample was assigned at random to any one particular combination.
Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were evaluated by asking subjects to make a series of choices over outcomes
that involve some uncertainty. To be clear, risk attitudes are elicited here simply as a convenient
-14-
vehicle to estimate the non-linear utility function of the individual. The theoretical requirement,
from the definition of the discount factor in (12), is for us to know the utility function over income
if we are to correctly infer the discount rate the individual used. The discount rate choices described
above are not defined over lotteries.
Our design poses a series of binary lottery choices. For example, lottery A might give the
individual a 50-50 chance of receiving 1600 kroner or 2000 kroner to be paid today, and lottery B
might have a 50-50 chance of receiving 3850 kroner or 100 kroner today. The subject picks A or B. 
One series of 10 choices would offer these prize sets with probabilities on the high prize in each
lottery starting at 0.1, then increasing by 0.1 until the last choice is between two certain amounts of
money.  In fact, these illustrative parameters and design was developed by Holt and Laury
[2002][2005] to elicit risk attitudes in the United States, and has been widely employed. Their
experimental procedures provided a decision sheet with all 10 choices arrayed in an ordered manner
on the same sheet; we used the procedures of Hey and Orme [1994], and presented each choice to
the subject as a “pie chart” showing prizes and probabilities. We gave subjects 40 choices, in four
sets of 10 with the same prizes. The prize sets employed are as follows: [A1: 2000 and 1600; B1:
3850 and 100], [A2: 1125 and 750; B2: 2000 and 250], [A3: 1000 and 875; B3: 2000 and 75] and [A4:
2250 and 1000; B4: 4500 and 50]. The order of these four sets was random for each subject, but
within each set the choices were presented in an ordered manner, with increments of the high prize
probability of 0.1.
The typical findings from lottery choice experiments of this kind are that individuals are
generally averse to risk, and that there is considerable heterogeneity in risk attitudes across subjects:
see Harrison and Rutström [2008] for an extensive review. Much of that heterogeneity is correlated
with observable characteristics, such as age and education level.
13 The only previous experiments with real  incentives that we know of that explicitly test for
multiattribute risk aversion were due to von Winterfeldt [1980]. He considered lottery choices of 18 subjects
defined over 36 consumption bundles of gallons of gasoline and pounds of ground beef. For example, the
lottery " might be a 50% chance of {16 gallons of gas and 10 pounds of ground beef} and a 50% chance of
{no gas and no beef}, and the lottery $ defined as a 50% chance of {10 pounds of ground beef} and a 50%
chance of {16 gallons of gas}. He used three different methods of eliciting preference: direct statement of
preference, including the option of indifference; a rating normalized between 0 and 100; and cash-equivalents
elicited using an incentive-compatible Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964] procedure with buying prices
elicited from between $0 and $20. It appears that only the choices in the last elicitation procedure were played
out for real, although the exposition is not completely clear (contrast the top of page 73 and the top of page
70). There were some response mode effects, of the kind now known as “preference reversals,” and some
violations of non-satiation. But the general conclusion is that “Multiattribute risk aversion showed very clearly
for all except two subjects” (p. 80). He also concluded that “Multiattribute risk aversion appeared unrelated to
[...] single attribute risk aversion” (p. 81). Pliskin, Shepard and Weinstein [1980] and Payne, Laughhunn and
Crum [1984] report experiments with hypothetical  incentives that test for multiattribute risk neutrality, and
respectively report results that support and reject that characterization.
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Intertemporal Risk Attitudes
Intertemporal risk attitudes were evaluated by asking subjects to make a series of choices
over uncertain profiles of outcomes that are paid out at different points in time.13 For example,
lottery A might give the individual a 10% chance of receiving 3850 kroner to be paid today and 100
kroner to be paid in 12 months and a 90% chance of receiving 100 kroner to be paid today and 3850
kroner to be paid in 12 months. Lottery B might give the individual a 10% chance of receiving 3850
kroner to be paid today and 3850 kroner to be paid in 12 months and a 90% chance of receiving 100
kroner to be paid today and 100 kroner to be paid in 12 months. The subject picks A or B. We gave
subjects 40 choices, in four sets of 10 with the same prizes. Each series of 10 choices would offer
the prize sets with probabilities on the high, sooner prize in each lottery starting at 0.1, then
increasing by 0.1 until the last choice is between two certain amounts of money. In this example, the
last choice would be a choice between receiving 3850 kroner now and 100 kroner in 12 months later
(lottery A) or receiving 3850 kroner now and 3850 kroner in 12 months (lottery B).
We present each choice to the subject as a “pie chart” showing prizes and probabilities. The
prize sets employed are as follows (with the sooner payment first and the later payment second):
14 That recruiting sample was drawn by us from a random sample of 50,000 adult Danes obtained
from the Civil Registration Office, which includes information on sex, age, residential location, marital status,
and whether the individual is an immigrant. We also randomized the fixed recruitment show-up fee across
subjects. All of this information can be used to evaluate the possibility of sample selection biases in the
manner of Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2009]. At a very broad level our sample was representative on
average: the sample of 50,000 had an average age of 49.8, 50.1% of them were married, and 50.7% were
female; our final sample of 413 had an average age of 48.7, 56.5% of them were married, and 48.2% were
female.
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[A1: (3850, 100) and (100, 3850); B1: (3850, 3850) and (100, 100)], [A2: (2000, 250) and (250, 2000);
B2: (2000, 2000) and (250, 250)], [A3: (2000, 75) and (75, 2000); B3: (2000, 2000) and (75, 75)] and
[A4: (4500, 50) and (50, 4500); B4: (4500, 4500) and (50, 50)]. One of these four sets was selected at
random for each subject.
Each subject is presented with choices over four time horizons between 2 weeks and 1 year
in the discount rate tasks, and the same four time horizons were applied in the intertemporal risk
aversion tasks. We also varied the time delay to the early payments on a between-subjects basis, and
this treatment again followed from the discount rate tasks. If there was no time delay to the early
payment in the discount rate tasks, then the early payments in the intertemporal risk aversion tasks
would also be paid out immediately, and similarly if the delay to the early payment option in the
discount rate tasks was 1 month. 
C. The Experiments
Between September 28 and October 22, 2009, we conducted experiments with 413 Danes.
The sample was drawn to be representative of the adult population as of January 1, 2009, using
sampling procedures that are virtually identical to those documented at length in Harrison, Lau,
Rutström and Sullivan [2005]. We received a random sample of the population aged between 18 and
75, inclusive, from the Civil Registration Office and sent out 1969 invitations.14
With a sample of 413, on average 25.8 subjects were assigned to each of the 16 treatments
15 An extra show-up fee of 200 kroner was paid to 35 subjects who had received invitations stating
300 kroner, but then received a final reminder that accidentally stated 500 kroner.
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for the discounting tasks. We did not develop this experimental design to estimate models at the
level of the individual subject or treatment condition, although obviously we will control for these
factors.
Our experiments were all conducted in hotel meeting rooms around Denmark, so that travel
logistics for the sample would be minimized. Various times of day were also offered to subjects, to
facilitate a broad mix of attendance. The largest session had 15 subjects, but most had fewer. The
procedures were standard: Appendix A documents an English translation of the instructions, and
shows typical screen displays. Subjects were given written instructions, which were also read out, and
then made choices in a trainer task, which was “played out” so that the full set of consequences of
each choice were clear. In fact, subjects were paid Big Ben caramels instead of money for all trainers,
and the payments were happily consumed when delivered. All interactions were by computer. The
order of the block of discount rate tasks and the block of risk attitudes tasks was randomized for
each session. After all choices had been made the subject was asked a series of standard socio-
demographic questions.
There were 40 discounting choices, 40 atemporal risk attitude choices and 40 intertemporal
risk attitude choices, and each subject had a 10% chance of being paid for one choice in each set of
40 choices. Average payments on the first block were 201.4 kroner (although some were for
deferred receipt), on the second block the average was 242.5 kroner, and average payments on the
third block were 270.7 kroner for a combined average of 714.6 kroner. The exchange rate at the time
was close to 5 kroner per U.S. dollar, so earnings averaged approximately 143 dollars per 2 two-hour
session for these tasks. Subjects were also paid a fixed show-up fee of 300 kroner or 500 kroner.15
For payments to be made in the future, the following language explained the procedures:
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You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. If you
receive some money today, then it is paid out at the end of the experiment. If you
receive some money to be paid in the future, then it is transferred to your personal
bank account on the specified date. In that case you will receive a written
confirmation from Copenhagen Business School which guarantees that the money is
reserved on an account at Danske Bank. You can send this document to Danske
Bank in a prepaid envelope, and the bank will transfer the money to your account on
the specified date.
Payments by way of bank transfer are common in Denmark, Copenhagen Business School is a well-
known educational institution in Denmark, and Danske Bank is the largest financial enterprise in
Denmark as measured by total assets.
3. Econometrics
Our objective is to evaluate alternative discounting functions reviewed in section 1. The
approach we adopt is direct estimation by maximum likelihood of some structural model of a latent
choice process in which the core parameters defining risk attitudes and discounting behavior can be
estimated. We review the basic inferential logic for estimating risk attitudes, and discuss the
extension to discounting behavior. Extensions to consider mixture specifications and random
coefficient models are considered in section 5.
A. Estimating the Atemporal Utility Function
Assume that the atemporal utility of income is defined over monetary payments z# and Z#  to
be paid at the end of the session, where z# < Z# . Just as x and y are elements of X and Y, z is a typical
element of Z. Since there is no temporal dimension of the set Z, z = u(z#). In general x and y are
defined over payments to be made in the future, although in some cases, with no front end delay,
payments may be made at the end of the session. Let the utility function defined over the typical
element z be the same as the utility functions (10) and (11) defined over x and y:
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u(z#) = z# 1!r/(1!r). (13)
Then, if p(z) denotes the objective probability of receiving z, we can define an expected utility of a
lottery defined over the two elements z# and Z# as:
EU = [ p(z#) × U(z#) ] + [ p(Z# ) × U(Z# ) ] (14)
The EU for each lottery pair on the right and left of the display is calculated for a candidate estimate
of r, and the index
LEU = EUB ! EUA (15)
calculated, where EUA is Option A and EUB is Option B as presented to subjects. This latent index,
based on latent preferences, is then linked to observed choices using the cumulative logistic
distribution function 7(LEU). This “logit” function takes any argument between ±4 and transforms
it into a number between 0 and 1. Thus we have the logit link function,
prob(choose lottery B) = 7(LEU) (16)
The index defined by (15) is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the B lottery is chosen
when 7(LEU)>½, which is implied by (16).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical specification and
the observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood is then
ln L(r; c, C ) = 3i [ (ln 7(LEU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln (1!7(LEU))×I(ci = !1)) ] (17)
where I(@) is the indicator function, ci =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option B (A) lottery in risk
aversion task i, and C is a vector of individual characteristics reflecting age, sex, race, and so on. The
parameter r is defined as a linear function of the characteristics in vector C.
Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix F] review procedures and syntax from the popular
statistical package Stata that can be used to estimate structural models of this kind. The goal is to
illustrate how experimental economists can write explicit maximum likelihood (ML) routines that are
16  Consider, as one important example, the Expo-Power (EP) utility function proposed by Saha
[1993]. Following Holt and Laury [2002], the EP function is defined as U(z) = [1!exp(!" z#1!Ë)]/", where "
and Ë are parameters to be estimated. RRA is then Ë + "(1!Ë)z#1!Ë, so RRA varies with income if "…0. This
function nests CRRA (as "60) and CARA (as Ë60).
-20-
specific to different structural choice models. It is a simple matter to correct for stratified survey
responses, multiple responses from the same subject (“clustering”), or heteroskedasticity, as needed.
Extensions of the basic model are easy to implement, and this is the major attraction of the
structural estimation approach. For example, one can easily extend the functional forms of utility to
allow for varying degrees of relative risk aversion (RRA).16 It is also simple matter to generalize this
ML analysis to allow any core parameter to be a linear function of observable characteristics of the
individual or task. For example, we would extend the model for the parameter r in (13) to be r = r0 +
R×C, where r0 is a fixed parameter and R is a vector of effects associated with each characteristic in
the variable vector C. In effect the unconditional model assumes r = r0 and just estimates r0. This
extension significantly enhances the attraction of structural ML estimation, particularly for responses
pooled over different subjects, since one can condition estimates on observable characteristics of the
task or subject.
An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some errors. The
notion of error is one that has already been encountered in the form of the statistical assumption
that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the EU of that lottery exceeds the EU of the
other lottery. This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index LEU
and the probability of picking one or other lottery; in the case of the logistic CDF, this link function
is 7(LEU). If there were no errors from the perspective of the decision-making model under risk,
this function would be a step function: zero for all values of LEU<0, anywhere between 0 and 1 for
LEU=0, and 1 for all values of LEU>0. 
The problem with this CDF is immediate: it predicts with probability one or zero. The
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likelihood approach asks the model to state the probability of observing the actual choice,
conditional on some trial values of the parameters of the theory. Maximum likelihood then locates
those parameters that generate the highest probability of observing the data. For binary choice tasks,
and independent observations, the likelihood of the sample is just the product of the likelihood of
each choice conditional on the model and the parameters assumed, and that the likelihood of each
choice is just the probability of that choice. So if we have any choice that has zero probability, and it
might be literally 1-in-a-million choices, the likelihood for that observation is not defined. Even if
we set the probability of the choice to some arbitrarily small, positive value, the log-likelihood
zooms off to minus infinity. We can reject the theory without even firing up any statistical package.
This implication is true for any theory that makes deterministic predictions, including
Expected Utility Theory. This is why one needs some formal statement about how the deterministic
prediction of the theory translates into a probability of observing one choice or the other, and then
perhaps also some formal statement about the role that structural errors might play. In short, one
cannot divorce the job of the theorist from the job of the econometrician, and some assumption about the process
of linking latent preferences and observed choices is needed. That assumption might be about the
mathematical form of the link, as in (16), but it cannot be avoided. Even the very definition of risk
aversion needs to be specified using stochastic terms unless we are to impose absurd economic
properties on estimates (Wilcox [2008][2010]).
We employ the error specification originally due to Fechner and popularized by Hey and
Orme [1994]. This error specification posits the latent index
LEU = (EUB ! EUA)/: (16N)
instead of (16), where : is a structural “noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the
perspective of the deterministic model of decision-making under risk. This is just one of several
different types of error story that could be used, and Wilcox [2008] provides a masterful review of
17 Some specifications place the error at the final choice between one lottery or after the subject has
decided which one has the higher expected utility; some place the error earlier, on the comparison of
preferences leading to the choice; and some place the error even earlier, on the determination of the expected
utility of each lottery.
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the implications of the alternatives.17 As :60 this specification collapses to the deterministic choice
model, where the choice is strictly determined by the EU of the two lotteries; but as : gets larger
and larger the choice essentially becomes random. When :=1 this specification collapses to (16),
where the probability of picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the EU of one lottery to the sum
of the EU of both lotteries. Thus : can be viewed as a parameter that flattens out the link functions
as it gets larger. We then extend the likelihood function to include the behavioral parameter:
ln LRA(r, :; c, C) = 3i [ (ln 7(LEU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln (1!7(LEU))×I(ci = !1)) ] (17N)
and calculate ML values of r and : by maximizing (17N).
An important contribution to the characterization of behavioral errors is the “contextual
error” specification proposed by Wilcox [2010]. It is designed to allow robust inferences about the
primitive “more stochastically risk averse than.” It posits the latent index
LEU = ((EUB ! EUA)<)/: (16O)
instead of (16N), where < is a new, normalizing term for each lottery pair A and B. The normalizing
term < is defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the minimum utility
over all prizes in this lottery pair. The value of < varies, in principle, from lottery choice to lottery
choice: hence it is said to be “contextual.” For the Fechner specification, dividing by < ensures that
the normalized EU difference [(EUB ! EUA)/<] remains in the unit interval.
B. Estimating the Discounting Function
For the moment, consider the intertemporal utility function (9), which is the same as
assuming that the agent is intertemporally risk neutral or intertemporally correlation neutral. A
18 We do not need to apply the contextual utility correction < for these choices since they are over
deterministic monetary amounts.
19 Direct evidence for the former proposition is provided by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2008b], who examine the temporal stability of risk attitudes in the Danish population. The second
proposition is a more delicate matter: even if utility functions are stable over time, they may not be
subjectively perceived to be, and that is what matters for use to assume that the same r that appears in (1)
appears in (9) and (10). When there is no front end delay, this assumption is immediate for (9), but not
otherwise.
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subject is indifferent between two time-dated income options x# and y# if and only if
Dt u(x#) =DJ+J u(y#) (18)
where u(x#) is the utility at time t of monetary outcome x# for delivery at time t, J is the horizon for
delivery of the later monetary outcome y# at time t+J, and Dt is the discount factor at time t. Thus
(18) is an indifference condition and D is the discount factor that equalizes the present value of the
utility of the two monetary outcomes x# and y#.
We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that our subjects made and jointly
estimate the risk parameter r in equation (13) and the discount rate parameter * in (18). We use the
same stochastic error specification as in (16N), albeit with a different Fechner error term :N for the
discount choices.18 Instead of (16N) we have
LPV = (PVB ! PVA)/:N, (19)
where the discounted utility of Option A is given by
PVA = (1/(1+*)t ) x# 1!r (20)
and the discounted utility of Option B is
PVB = (1/(1+*)t+J ) y# 1!r, (21)
and x# and y# are the monetary amounts in the choice tasks presented to subjects for delivery at time t
and time t+J, respectively. The parameter :N captures noise for the discount rate choices, just as :
was a noise parameter for the risk aversion choices. We assume here that the utility function is stable
over time and is perceived ex ante to be stable over time.19
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Thus the likelihood of the discount rate responses, conditional on the EUT, CRRA and
exponential discounting specifications being true, not to mention the assumption of intertemporal
risk neutrality, depends on the estimates of r, *, : and :N, given the assumed value of T and the
observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood is
ln LDR(r, *, :, :N; c, C) = 3i [ (ln 7(LPV)×I(ci=1)) + (ln (1!7(LPV))×I(ci=!1)) ] (23)
where ci =1(!1) denotes the choice of Option B (A) in discount rate task i, and C is again a vector
of individual characteristics.
The joint likelihood of the risk aversion and discount rate responses, under the maintained
assumption for now of intertemporal risk neutrality, can then be written as
ln L (r, *, :, :N; c, C) = ln LRA + ln LDR (24)
where LRA is defined by (17N) and LDR is defined by (23). This expression can then be maximized
using standard numerical methods.
Nothing in this inferential procedure relied on the use of EUT, or the CRRA functional
form. Nor did anything rely on the use of the exponential discounting function. These methods
generalize immediately to alternative multiattribute models of decision making under risk, such as
those presented in Miyamota and Wakker [1996]. They also extend to specifications that use
alternative discounting functions, such as presented in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2011a]. The key innovation here, however, is to replace (18N) and (23) with non-additive
specifications that allow for correlation aversion.
C. Estimating the Intertemporal Utility Function
The next step is to consider non-additive separable specifications of the intertemporal utility
function and estimate the coefficient of intertemporal risk aversion. Equation (12) is a simple
extension of the additively separable model in (9) and implies that the expected utility of Option A
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in the intertemporal risk aversion task is given by
PEUA = p(X# , y# )×[Dt u(X# ) + Dt+J u(y#)](1!0)/(1!0) + p(x#, Y# )×[Dt u(x#) + Dt+J u(Y# ))](1!0)/(1!0)     (25)
and the expected utility of Option B is given by
PEUB = p(X# , Y# )×[Dt u(X# ) + Dt+J u(Y# )](1!0)/(1!0) + p(x#, y#)×[Dt u(x#) + Dt+J u(y#))](1!0)/(1!0)     (26)
where p(x, y) is the probability of receiving x in period t and y in period t+J. We can again write out
the likelihood function for the choices that the subjects made and jointly estimate the risk parameter
r, the discount rate parameter *, and the intertemporal risk parameter 0. We employ the contextual
error specification, and the latent index is specified by
LPEU = ((PEUB ! PEUA)<N)/:O (27)
where :Ois a noise parameter for the intertemporal risk aversion choices. The normalizing term <N is
defined as the maximum intertemporal utility over all prize profiles in this lottery pair (X# , Y# ) minus
the minimum utility over all prize profiles in this lottery pair (x#, y#). The maximum intertemporal
utility over all prize profiles in the lottery pair is [Dt u(X# ) + Dt+J u(Y# )](1!0)/(1!0), and the minimum
intertemporal utility is [Dt u(x#) + Dt+J u(y#)](1!0)/(1!0).
The likelihood of the intertemporal risk aversion responses, conditional on the specification
of intertemporal utility being true, depends on the estimates of r, *, 0, :, :N and :O, given the
observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood is
ln L (r, *, 0, :, :N, :O; c, C) = 3i [ (ln 7(LEV)×I(ci=1)) + (ln (1!7(LEV))×I(ci=!1)) ] (28)
where ci =1(!1) denotes the choice of Option B (A) in intertemporal risk aversion task i, and C is
again a vector of individual characteristics.
The joint likelihood of the atemporal risk aversion, discount rate and intertemporal risk
aversion responses can then be written as
ln L (r, *, 0, :, :N, :O; c, C) = ln LRA + ln LDR + ln LSDR (29)
20 This experimental design principle applies more broadly. It is sometimes possible to design
experimental procedures that do not require two or more experimental tasks, and embed the identification of
the utility function into one task. We do not know how to do that with respect to intertemporal risk aversion.
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where LRA is defined by (20N), LDR is defined by (24) and LSDR is defined by (28).
The recursive nature of this joint likelihood function is matched by our experimental design.
Ignoring the objective parameters of the tasks, the lottery choices over stochastic lotteries paid out
today (RA) depend on r and :; the discounting tasks over non-stochastic outcomes paid out today
or some time in the future (DR) depend on r, :, * and :N; and the discounting tasks over stochastic
outcomes paid out today or some time in the future (SDR) depend on r, :, *, :N, 0 and :O. Putting
the behavioral error terms aside, if we were to try to estimate r and * using either the RA or the DR
choices, we would be unable to identify both parameters. Similarly, if we were to try to estimate r, *
and 0 using only two of three tasks, we would face an identification problem. These identification
problems are inherent to the theoretical definitions of the discount rate and correlation aversion, and
demand an experimental design that combines multiple types of choices and an econometric
approach that recognizes the complete structural model. The general principle is a recursive design,
combined with joint estimation of all structural parameters so that uncertainty about the parameters
defining the utility function propagates in a “full information” sense into the uncertainty about the
parameters defining the discount function and the intertemporal utility function. Intuitively, if the
experimenter only has a vague notion of what u(.) is, because of poor estimates of r, then one cannot
make precise inferences about * or 0 are. Similarly, poor estimates of *, even if r is estimated
relatively precisely, imply that one cannot make precise inferences about 0.20
21 Virtually identical results are obtained if one uses the Expo-Power atemporal utility function.
22 The estimates of r and * are comparable to those reported for the specification in Andersen,
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] that sampled the same adult Danish population in 2003, but assumed
intertemporal risk neutrality. In that case the point estimate of r = RRA was 0.74 and the discount rate * was
estimated to be 10.1% (Table III, p.601). If we impose the constrain 0=0 in our analysis, the log-likelihood
drops significantly from -26347.1 to -26568.5, although the estimates for r and * in Table 1 are virtually
identical.
23 We evaluate RRA in the special case where MRS t, t+J (x/y) = 1. In this case RRA t = RRA t+J =0(1!r)/2 + r.   
24 The matrix of risk premia in the multiattribute case is characterized by Duncan [1977] and Karni
[1979]. Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974; §2.2] derived a “directional risk premium” which takes on as many
values as there are possible “directions,” and so is also multi-valued. But they pointed out their measure
allowed unique comparisons of utility functions representing the same ordinal preferences.
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4. Results
A. Basic Results
Table 1 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the specification with the CRRA atemporal
utility function defined by (13).21 There is evidence of a concave atemporal utility function (r>0),
with r estimated to be 0.55. The discount rate is estimated to be 7.7% on an annualized basis.22 The
main novelty here is evidence of intertemporal risk aversion, with 0 estimated to be 0.44 and
statistically different from 0. The implication is that there should be a difference between the inverse
of RRA and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution IES (which is equal to 1/r), and this is
confirmed by the implied estimates in Panel D of Table 1. The IES is estimated to be 1.81 with a
standard error of 0.10, and it exceeds the inverse of RRA by 0.27.23 This difference between the IES
and the inverse of RRA is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001.
We can derive the certainty equivalents for each lottery in Option A and Option B of the
intertemporal risk aversion tasks using (12), and then evaluate the risk premia associated with
different prize sets.24 Option A pays (X# , y#) with probability p(X# , y#) and (x#, Y# ) with probability
(1!p(X# , y#)). The decision tasks are designed such that x#=y# and X# =Y# . If we assume, for simplicity,
that the discount rate is equal to zero, then the present value of Option A is X# +x# kroner. If we
define the certainty equivalent as either (X# , x#) or (x#, X# ) then the risk premium is equal to zero for
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the lotteries in Option A. However, if we define the certainty equivalent as the same certain amount
to be paid out in both time periods, instead of high amount X#  and a low amount x#, then the
certainty equivalent is
CEA = [(X# (1!r)+x#(1!r))/2] 1/(1!r) (30)
where CEA is paid out in period t and in period t+J. We can then define the risk premium of the
lotteries in Option A as
RPA = (X# +x#) ! 2CEA (31)
The subject prefers to smooth consumption over time if the atemporal utility function is concave,
which is just to say that the risk premium is positive when r>0. Using the estimated model from
Table 1, the estimated risk premium is 1,508 kroner for prize set A1, 462 kroner for prize set A2,
723 kroner for prize set A3, and 2,014 kroner for prize set A4. 
If we allow the discount rate to be positive then the certainty equivalent for Option A is
CEA = [PEUA 1/(1!0) / (Dt + Dt+J)] 1/(1!r) (30N)
where PEUA is the expected utility of Option A given by (25). The risk premium is then derived as
RPA = p(X# , y#)×[Dt X#  + Dt+J y#] + (1!p(X# , y#))×[Dt x# + Dt+J Y# ] ! (Dt + Dt+J)×CEA (31N)
The estimated risk premium for prize set A1 varies between 1,451 kroner when p(X# , y#)=0.1 and
1,455 kroner when p(X# , y#)=1. The estimated risk premium for A2 is 445 and 446 kroner for p(X# , y#)
equal to 0.1 and 1, respectively. Similarly, the risk premium interval is [695; 697] for A3 and [1,936;
1,943] for A4. Hence, the estimated risk premium for Option A falls slightly when we consider
positive discount rates.
 The lotteries in Option B pay (X# , X# ) with probability p(X# , X# ) and (x#, x#) with probability
(1!p(X# , X# )). The certainty equivalent of Option B is
CEB = [p(X# , X# ) × X# (1!r)(1!0)+(1!p(X# , X# )) × x#(1!r)(1!0)]1/(1!r)(1!0) (32)
where CEB is again a certain amount that is paid out in both period t and period t+J. This definition
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of certainty equivalence implies that CEB is independent of the discount rate and is equal to X#  if
p(X# , X# )=1 and equal to x# if p(X# , X# )=0. The risk premium is then
RPB = p(X# , X# ) × X#  + (1!p(X# , X# )) × x# ! CEB , (33)
which is equal to 0 if p(X# , X# ) is equal to 0 or 1.
Figure 1 displays the estimated risk premium as a function of p(X# , X# ) for each of the four
prize sets in Option B of the intertemporal risk aversion task. The solid line is based on the
estimated parameter values for r and 0 in Table 1, and the dashed line is based on a constrained
model in which we assume that 0 is equal to 0. Hence the risk premium when 0=0, and the decision
maker is assumed to be correlation neutral (CN), derives entirely from the atemporal risk aversion r
of the decision maker. When 0 and r are positive, and the decision maker is correlation averse (CA)
as well as being atemporally risk averse, the risk premium derives from both types of risk aversion.
The results show that intertemporal risk aversion accounts for a substantial amount of the estimated risk premium.
For example, the upper left panel shows that the risk premium for prize set B1 is equal to 2,086
kroner in the unconstrained model when p(X# , X# )=0.5 and is equal to 1,512 kroner when the
intertemporal risk aversion parameter 0 is constrained to be 0, so the difference of 574 kroner is due
to correlation aversion. 
It is a simple matter to extend the econometric model to allow structural parameters to
depend on observed demographics and experimental treatments. Appendix B documents those
estimates. Figure 2 displays the implied distributions of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the inverse of relative risk aversion. If the subjects are intertemporally risk neutral, then the
predicted values of the two coefficients would be identical and the two curves be identical. The
results show that there is some heterogeneity across subjects in the sample with respect to atemporal
risk attitudes and the willingness to substitute consumption over time. The predicted values of IES
have an estimated mean of 2.07 and standard deviation of 0.84, the population distribution of the
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inverse of RRA has a mean of 1.92 and standard deviation of 1.51. Figure 3 shows the estimated
distribution of the difference between the IES and inverse of RRA. This distribution has an
estimated mean of 0.16, with a standard deviation of 1.20, and the 95% confidence interval is
between !1.32 and 1.38. Despite the relatively wide confidence interval more than 75% of the
observations are positive, and the general tendency away from intertemporal risk neutrality is
observed. 
B. The Coefficient of Correlation Aversion
Figure 4 displays the predicted distribution of the coefficient of correlation aversion (CCA),
evaluated using (5N) and the four prize sets in the intertemporal risk aversion tasks. The upper left
panel shows predicted CCA values for the income profile with high sooner payments and low later
payments. The predicted mean is 0.10 (÷ 1000), with a standard deviation of 0.08 (÷ 1000). There is
clear evidence of correlation aversion in general, although roughly 5% of the sample exhibits
correlation neutrality or correlation loving preferences. The lower left panel displays the predicted
distribution for the income profile with low sooner payments and high later payments. If the
individual discount rate is equal to 0 then the predicted values of CCA in the upper and lower left
panels would be the same. The predicted mean of the individual discount rate for the sample is
0.076 with a standard deviation of 0.022, and we therefore see small differences between the
estimated means and standard deviations across the two income profiles in the upper and lower left
panels. The upper and lower right panels show the predicted distributions for the income profiles
with two high payments and two low payments respectively. The general pattern is the same as
before, although the estimated means and standard deviations are lower (higher) for the income
profile with two high (low) payments. Thus we observe correlation aversion in general across the
four income profiles in the intertemporal risk aversion tasks. 
25 There are many variants from the exponential model, and most are evaluated by Andersen,
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2011a] using the separable and additive intertemporal utility function (9).
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We can also consider a more flexible specification of the inter-temporal utility function and
replace the CRRA specification in (12) with a two-parameter version of the cumulative gamma
distribution. There are very few a priori restrictions on the shape of the gamma distribution other
than those of a cumulative density function. The estimated coefficients of r and * are the same as
before: the estimated IES is equal to 1.81 and the discount rate is estimated to be 7.7% on an
annualized basis. However, we find that the estimated CCA is higher when the CRRA specification
is replaced by the gamma distribution. We evaluate the CCA using the four prize sets in the
intertemporal risk aversion tasks, as before, and find that CCA is 1.2 (÷ 1000) for the income profile
with low sooner payments and low later payments, and 8.3 (÷ 1000) for the income profile with high
sooner payments and high later payments. The estimated CCA are significantly different from 0, and
we observe correlation aversion in general when the gamma function is used. 
C. Non-Exponential Discounting
The concept of intertemporal correlation aversion does not depend on the use of the
exponential discounting model. To illustrate the generality of the results, we consider the effect of
using two popular alternative discounting models.25 The exponential discounting model may be
viewed as assuming a constant variable utility cost per time period of delay. These two alternatives are (a)
the Quasi-Hyperbolic specification that allows for a fixed utility cost as well as a constant variable utility
cost, and (b) the Weibull specification that allows for a non-constant variable utility cost.
The discount factor for the Quasi-Hyperbolic (QH) specification is defined as
DQH(t) = 1 if t = 0 (34a)
DQH(t) = $/(1+*)t if t > 0 (34b)
26 Any probability density function f(t) defined on [0, 4) can form the basis of a discounting function
by taking the integral of f(t) between t and 4. Indeed, discounting functions are formally identical to the
“survivor functions” that labor and health economists routinely estimate in duration models, and are also
known as “reliability functions” in the applied statistics literature on failure. Hence familiar and flexible
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where $<1 implies quasi-hyperbolic discounting and $=1 is exponential discounting. Although the *
in (34b) may be estimated to be a different value than the * in (9), we use the same notation to allow
comparability of functional forms. The defining characteristic of the QH specification is that the
discount factor has a jump discontinuity at t=0, and that is thereafter exactly the same as the
exponential specification. The discount rate for the QH specification is the value of dQH that solves
DQH = 1/(1+dQH), so it is
dQH(t) = 1/ [ $/(1+*)t ](1/t) ! 1 (35)
for t>0. Thus for $<1 we observe sharply declining discount rates in the very short run, and then
discount rates asymptoting towards * as the effect of the initial drop in the discount factor
diminishes.  The drop $ can be viewed as fixed utility cost of discounting anything relative to the
present, since it does not vary with the horizon t once t>0. The QH specification was introduced by
Phelps and Pollak [1968] for a social planning problem, and applied to model individual behavior by
Elster [1979; p.71] and then Laibson [1997].
The QH performs poorly in our model with intertemporal risk aversion, in the sense that the
coefficient $ is not significantly different from 1, which of course is the exponential case. We
estimate the value to be 1.003, with a 95% confidence interval between 0.993 and 1.01. The
estimated values for r, * and 0 are virtually identical to those shown in Table 1 for the exponential
specification (which is not surprising if $.1). It is worth noting that the QH model performs poorly
with these data even when one assumes intertemporal risk neutrality: see Andersen, Harrison, Lau
and Rutström [2011a].
The discount factor for the Weibull distribution from statistics26 is defined as
families of probability density functions, such as the Gamma or Weibull, can be used to directly define
discounting functions. This has the attraction of allowing the analyst to rely on a large literature in statistics on
the properties of these functions for different inferential purposes.
27 The Weibull specification is the same as the simple functional form in Prelec [2004; p. 526] and
applied in Ebert and Prelec [2007; p. 1424ff.] and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a; p. 607].
-33-
DW(t) = exp(-Ët1/Ñ) (36)
for Ë > 0 and Ñ > 0. For Ñ=1 this collapses to the exponential specification, and hence the parameter
Ñ can be viewed as reflecting the “slowing down” or “speeding up” of time as perceived by the
individual. This specification is due to Read [2001; p. 25, equation (16)], although he noted (p.25,
equation (15)) that the same point about time perception was implicit in an earlier generalization of
the hyperbolic due to Mazur [1984; p.427].27 The discount rate at time t in the Weibull specification
is then
dW(t) = exp(Ët (1-Ñ)/Ñ ) ! 1 (37)
Thus one can again see the exponential emerge as a special case when Ñ=1.
The Weibull model also performs poorly in our data, in the sense that the key parameter Ñ is
estimated to be 1.047, with a standard error of 0.140 and a 95% confidence interval between 0.77
and 1.32. This uncertainty in the estimate of Ñ does translate into some uncertainty about discount
rates in the short-run, but not in a significant way. For horizons of 1 week the implied discount rate
is 0.092, for 3 months it is 0.082, and for 1 year it is 0.077; the confidence intervals for these
estimates are 0 : 0.19, 0.05 : 0.11 and 0.06 : 0.09, respectively. Again, the estimates of r, * and 0
are virtually identical to those shown in Table 1 for the exponential specification.
Although our evaluation of alternatives to the exponential discounting model is not
exhaustive, doing so would be exhausting. And the results from examining these two alternatives
suggest that the effort would be unproductive.
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D. Non-Expected Utility Theory
The concept of intertemporal correlation aversion does not depend on the use of the
expected utility model, just as one can extend multiattribute utility theory to a wide range of non-
EUT models (Miyamoto and Wakker [1996]). To illustrate the generality of the results in this
respect, we consider the effect of using a popular alternative model due to Quiggin [1982] which
relaxes the independence axiom. The Rank-Dependant Utility (RDU) model posits probability
weights based on some continuous function of the objective probabilities, and then infers decisions
weights from these probability weights. The probability and decision weights depend on the rank of
the outcome, in a familiar manner. If Z#  > z#, then we can rewrite 
EU = [p(z#) × U(z#)] + [p(Z# ) × U(Z# )] (14)
as
RDU = [(1!w(p(Z# )) × U(z#)] + [w(p(Z# )) × U(Z# )] (14N)
for some probability weighting function w(p). We use the simple power function
w(p) = p( (34)
and recognize that there is a veritable menagerie of such functions in use. Of course, expected utility
theory assumes the identity function w(p)=p, which is the case when (=1.
When the outcome is simply an amount of money, as in our atemporal lottery tasks, there is
no complication calculating the rank in order to apply the RDU model. When the outcome consists
of two time-dated amounts of money, as in our temporal lottery tasks, one has to be a bit more
careful. The natural quantity to base the rank on is then the present value of the atemporal utilities
afforded by the two time-dated amounts of money. To see this explicitly, recall the expression for
option A, referred to generically as lottery " in the definition of correlation aversion:
PEUA = p(X# , y#)×[Dt u(X# ) + Dt+J u(y#)](1!0)/(1!0) + p(x#, Y# )×[Dt u(x#) + Dt+J u(Y# ))](1!0)/(1!0)     (25)
Define v(X# , y#) = [Dt u(X# ) + Dt+J u(y#)] and v(x#, Y# ) = [Dt u(x#) + Dt+J u(Y# ))] for notational ease.  The
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ranks of v(X# , y#) and v(x#, Y# ) would be calculated, and of course these depend on the values of r and
*, as well as x#, X# , y# and Y# . It is not a priori possible to determine these ranks, but they are
conceptually well defined given the values indicated. If the stream {X# , y#} had a higher value than {x#,
Y# } then the rank-dependent utility would be
PRDUA = w(p(X# , y#)) × v(X# , y#)(1!0)/(1!0) + (1!w(p(X# , y#))) × v(x#, Y# )(1!0)/(1!0)     (25N)
and if the stream {X# , y#} had a lower  value than {x#, Y# } then the rank-dependent utility would be
PRDUA = (1!w(p(x#, Y# ))) × v(X# , y#)(1!0)/(1!0) + w(p(x#, Y# )) × v(x#, Y# )(1!0)/(1!0)     (25O)
A similar construction applies for option B, although there one can trivially identify the ranks on an
a priori basis.
After all that work, there is no real impact from allowing for this violation of expected utility
theory. The estimated value of ( is 1.03, with a 95% confidence of 0.95 : 1.10, so one cannot reject
the hypothesis that (=1. There are some slight changes in the other core structural parameters from
Table 1: r is now estimated to be 0.53, * is estimated to be 0.081, and 0 is estimated to be 0.47.
None of these are significantly different from their expected utility counterparts.
There are more flexible probability weighting functions, but they do not appear to add much
to the characterization of risk attitudes for these subjects (see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2011a; §5A]).
5. Conclusions
We elicit intertemporal risk attitudes from a representative sample of the adult Danish
population using real economic commitments. The results suggest that intertemporal risk aversion is
a better characterization of the average Dane than intertemporal risk neutrality. This result implies
that the convenient additive specification of the intertemporal utility function is not an appropriate
representation of intertemporal preferences for the general Danish population.
28 Experiments studying these models, and considering the delayed resolution and/or payments of
lottery outcomes, include Noussair and Wu [1996] and Coble and Lusk [2010]. There have also been
experiments over non-salient or hypothetical rewards, such as Ahlbrecht and Weber [1997].
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In one sense this result is by now well known from the vast literature on “exotic
preferences” in macroeconomics. We agree with Backus, Routledge and Zin [2004; p.382]:
We think several varieties of exotic preferences have already proved themselves.
Applications of Kreps-Porteus and Epstein-Zin preferences to asset pricing,
precautionary saving, and risk-sharing are good examples. While these preferences
have not solved all of our problems, they have become a frequent source of insight.
Their ease of use in econometric work is another point in their favor.
Of course, these approaches have “proved themselves” by being sufficient  to characterize risk and
time preferences in a flexible manner.28 Nobody has claimed that they are necessary, or the only way
to characterize preferences flexibly. Habit persistence in preferences and/or durable consumption
goods can generate non-separable utility representations that can also allow risk and time
preferences to be teased apart (e.g., Constantinides [1990] and Dunn and Singleton [1986]). Our
contribution is to demonstrate that separable, non-additive representations that do not require
relaxations of expected utility theory can be evaluated in a controlled environment. Their relative
value in characterizing naturally-occurring macroeconomic data, such as the tests of alternative habit
persistence models in Ferson and Constantinides [1991], is not something we consider.
Our findings have important implications for the characterization of intertemporal
preferences in policy applications, theoretical modeling, and experimental economics.
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Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates Assuming CRRA Atemporal Utility Function
N=49,560 observations, based on 413 subjects
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
A. Atemporal Utility Function
r 0.55 0.031 <0.001 0.49 0.61
: 0.18 0.011 <0.001 0.16 0.2
B. Discounting Function
* 0.077 0.0077 <0.001 0.062 0.093
:N 0.13 0.009 <0.001 0.12 0.15
C. Intertemporal Utility Function
0 0.44 0.082 <0.001 0.28 0.6
:O 0.18 0.01 <0.001 0.16 0.2
D. Implied Estimates
RRA 0.65 0.039 <0.001 0.57 0.73
1/RRA 1.54 0.093 <0.001 1.36 1.72
IES 1.81 0.102 <0.001 1.61 2.02
IES ! 1/RRA 0.27 0.036 <0.001 0.2 0.34
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Prize sets in Option B of the intertemporal risk aversion task. Risk Premia for the
correlation neutral (CN) case derive only from atemporal risk aversion; risk premia for the
correlation averse (CA) case derive from both intertemporal and atemporal risk aversion.
Figure 1: Estimated Risk Premia
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-40-
D
en
si
ty
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
IES - Inverse of RRA
Predicted values based on ML estimates with observable demographics; N=413
Mean=0.16, std.dev.=1.20, 95% confidence interval=[-1.32, 1.38]
Figure 3: Difference in Distributions of the Intertemporal
Elasticity of Substitution and the Inverse of Relative Risk Aversion
-41-
D
en
si
ty
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
CCA (scaled by 1000)
High sooner and low later payments
Mean=0.10
Std.d.=0.08
D
en
si
ty
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
CCA (scaled by 1000)
High sooner and high later payments
Mean=0.04
Std.d.=0.03
D
en
si
ty
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
CCA (scaled by 1000)
Low sooner and high later payments
Mean=0.10
Std.d.=0.08
D
en
si
ty
-5 0 5
CCA (scaled by 1000)
Low sooner and low later payments
Mean=1.17
Std.d.=1.21
Predicted values based on ML estimates with observable demographics; N=413
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Appendix A: Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
We document the instructions by first listing the “manuscript” that shows what was given to
subjects and read to them, and then we document some of the screen displays. The original Danish
manuscript is available on request. The originals were in 14-point font, printed on A4 paper for nice
page breaks (a horizontal line below indicates a page break), and given to subjects in laminated form.
Any experimenter that would like to buy a used laminating machine should contact Steffen
Andersen. The manuscript below was for the sessions in which the discount rate task was presented
first. After these experimental tasks were completed there were additional tasks in the session that
are not relevant here.
A. Experimental Manuscript
Welcome announcement
[Give informed consent form to subjects.]
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. The survey is financed by the Social
Science Research Council and the Carlsberg Foundation and concerns the economics of decision
making. 
Before we begin the survey, let me read out the informed consent form that is handed out to
you. This form explains your rights as a participant in the survey, what the survey is about and how
we make payments to you.
[Read the informed consent form.]
Is everyone able to stay for the full two hours of the meeting? Before we begin, I will ask
each of you to pick an envelope from me. The envelope contains a card with an ID number that we
will use to keep track of who answered which questions. All records and published results will be
linked to anonymous ID numbers only, and not to your name. Please keep your ID numbers private
and do not share the information with anyone else. 
[Each subject picks an envelope.]
You will be given written instructions during the survey, but make all decisions on the
computer in front of you. Please enter your ID number on the computer in front of you, but keep
the card for later use.
You will now continue with the first task. The problem is not designed to test you. The only
right answer is what you really would choose. That is why the task gives you the chance of winning
money. I will now distribute the instructions and then read it out loud. 
[Give IDR instructions to subjects.]
[Read the IDR instructions.]
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Task D
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options labeled “A” and “B”.
An example of your task is shown on the right. You will make all decisions on a computer.
All decisions have the same format. In the example on the right Option A pays 100 kroner
today and Option B pays 105 kroner twelve months from now. By choosing option B you would get
an annual return of 5% on the 100 kroner.
We will present you with 40 of these decisions. The only difference between them is that the
amounts and payment dates in Option A and B will differ. 
You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of these decisions. The selection is
made with a 10-sided die. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of these
40 decisions, then we will further select one of these decisions by rolling a 4-sided and a 10-sided
die. When you make your choices you will not know which decision is selected for payment. You
should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment.
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. If you receive some
money today, then it is paid out at the end of the experiment. If you receive some money to be paid
in the future, then it is transferred to your personal bank account on the specified date. In that case
you will receive a written confirmation from Copenhagen Business School which guarantees that the
money is reserved on an account at Danske Bank. You can send this document to Danske Bank in a
prepaid envelope, and the bank will transfer the money to your account on the specified date. 
Before making your choices you will have a chance to practice so that you better understand
the consequences of your choices. Please proceed on the computer to the practice task. You will be
paid in caramels for this practice task, and they are being paid on the time stated in your preferred
option.
[Subjects make decisions in the practice IDR task.]
I will now come around and pay you in caramels for your choice of A or B. Please proceed
to the actual task after your earnings are recorded. You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for
one of the 40 decisions in the actual task. 
Password 1:____
[Subjects make decisions in the actual IDR task.]
I will now come around and ask you to roll a 10-sided die to determine if you are being paid
for one of the decisions. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of the
40 decisions, then I will ask you to roll a 4-sided and a 10-sided die to select one of the decisions for
-49-
payment. 
Password 2:____
[Roll 10-sided die to determine if they are being paid.]
[Roll 4-sided and 10-sided dice to determine the decision for payment.]
You will now continue with the second task. I will distribute the instructions and then read it
out loud. 
[Give RA instructions to subjects.]
[Read the RA instructions.]
Task L
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options labeled “A” and “B”.
An example of your task is shown on the right. You will make all decisions on a computer.
All decisions have the same format. In the example on the right Option A pays 60 kroner if
the outcome of a roll of a ten-sided die is 1, and it pays 40 kroner if the outcome is 2-10. Option B
pays 90 kroner if the outcome of the roll of the die is 1 and 10 kroner if the outcome is 2-10. All
payments in this task are made today at the end of the experiment.
We will present you with 40 such decisions. The only difference between them is that the
probabilities and amounts in Option A and B will differ.
You have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of these decisions. The selection is made
with a 10-sided die. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of these
40 decisions, then we will further select one of these decisions by rolling a 4-sided and a 10-sided
die. A third die roll with a 10-sided die determines the payment for your choice of Option A or B.
When you make your choices you will not know which decision is selected for payment. You should
therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment.
If you are being paid for one of the decisions, we will pay you according to your choice in
the selected decision. You will then receive the money at the end of the experiment. 
Before making your choices you will have a chance to practice so that you better understand
the consequences of your choices. Please proceed on the computer to the practice task. You will be
paid in caramels for this practice task. 
[Subjects make decisions in the practice RA task.]
I will now come around and pay you in caramels for your choice of A or B. I will ask you to
roll a 10-sided die to determine the payment for your choice of A or B. Please proceed to the actual
-50-
task after your earnings are recorded. You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of the 40
decisions in the actual task.
Password 3:____
[Subjects make decisions in the actual RA task.]
I will now come around and ask you to roll a 10-sided die to determine if you are being paid
for one of the decisions. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of the
40 decisions, then I will ask you to roll a 4-sided and a 10-sided die to select one of the decisions for
payment. A third die roll with a 10-sided die determines the payment for your choice of Option A or
B. 
Password 4:____
[Roll 10-sided die to determine if they are being paid.]
[Roll 4-sided and 10-sided dice to determine the decision for payment.]
[Roll 10-sided die to determine payment in Option A and B.]
You will now continue with the third task. I will distribute the instructions and then read it
out loud. 
[ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROVIDED HERE]
B. Typical Screen Shots for Lottery Choices
The first screen shot on the next page shows the full screen within which the text box is
contained, so that one gets an impression of what the subject encountered in all screen shots. Then
we display more detailed screen shots of the practice example and the first few lottery choices. Prior
to each block of 10 lottery choices the subject was told that the lottery prizes for the next 10 choices
would stay the same and the only thing that would vary would be the probabilities. We then show
the sequence of the first two lotteries, and then lottery 11 which uses new prizes.
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C. Typical Screen Shots for Discounting Choices
The next page shows the practice example provided at the beginning of these tasks. The top
panel shows the initial screen shot, and then the next two panels show how the selected option is
highlighted to make it clear to the subject which option is being selected.
The following page shows the information that was given to each subject prior to each block
of 10 choices. This information was that the principal and horizon would remain constant for the
next 10 choices, but that the only thing that would change would be the amount in the “later”
option. In these displays the implied interest rate is displayed.
Finally, after the first 10 choices a new horizon was selected for the next 10 choices.
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D. Typical Screen Shots for Intertemporal Risk Aversion Choices
The next page shows the practice example provided at the beginning of these tasks. The top
panel shows the initial screen shot, and then the next two panels show how the selected option is
highlighted to make it clear to the subject which option is being selected.
The following page shows two of the actual tasks for a subject with no front end delay. The
lottery prizes were always the same. Option A always had a mixture of the higher and smaller
amount, with the first option having the higher amount sooner and the smaller amount later, and the
second option having the lower amount sooner and the higher amount later. Option B always had
the all-high or all-lower amounts.
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E. Parameter Values
Table A1 shows the parameters of the lottery choice tasks, Table A2 shows the parameters
of the discounting choice tasks, and Table A3 shows the parameters of the intertemporal risk
aversion choices.
In Table A1 the parameters are (1) the decision number, (2) the probability of the high prize
in each lottery, (3) the high prize of lottery A, in kroner, (4) the low prize of lottery A, in kroner, (5)
the high prize of lottery B, in kroner, (6) the low prize of lottery B, in kroner, (7) the expected value
of lottery A, and (8) the expected value of lottery B. The information in columns (7) and (8) was not
presented to subjects.
Table A1: Parameters for Lottery Choices
Decision Probability
of High Prize
Lottery A
High Prize 
Lottery A
Low Prize
Lottery B
High Prize
Lottery B
Low Prize
EV of
Lottery A
EV of
Lottery B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 0.1 1125 750 2000 250 787.5 425
2 0.2 1125 750 2000 250 825 600
3 0.3 1125 750 2000 250 862.5 775
4 0.4 1125 750 2000 250 900 950
5 0.5 1125 750 2000 250 937.5 1125
6 0.6 1125 750 2000 250 975 1300
7 0.7 1125 750 2000 250 1012.5 1475
8 0.8 1125 750 2000 250 1050 1650
9 0.9 1125 750 2000 250 1087.5 1825
10 1 1125 750 2000 250 1125 2000
11 0.1 1000 875 2000 75 887.5 267.5
12 0.2 1000 875 2000 75 900 460
13 0.3 1000 875 2000 75 912.5 652.5
14 0.4 1000 875 2000 75 925 845
15 0.5 1000 875 2000 75 937.5 1037.5
16 0.6 1000 875 2000 75 950 1230
17 0.7 1000 875 2000 75 962.5 1422.5
18 0.8 1000 875 2000 75 975 1615
19 0.9 1000 875 2000 75 987.5 1807.5
20 1 1000 875 2000 75 1000 2000
21 0.1 2000 1600 3850 100 1640 475
22 0.2 2000 1600 3850 100 1680 850
23 0.3 2000 1600 3850 100 1720 1225
24 0.4 2000 1600 3850 100 1760 1600
25 0.5 2000 1600 3850 100 1800 1975
26 0.6 2000 1600 3850 100 1840 2350
27 0.7 2000 1600 3850 100 1880 2725
28 0.8 2000 1600 3850 100 1920 3100
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29 0.9 2000 1600 3850 100 1960 3475
30 1 2000 1600 3850 100 2000 3850
31 0.1 2250 1000 4500 50 1125 495
32 0.2 2250 1000 4500 50 1250 940
33 0.3 2250 1000 4500 50 1375 1385
34 0.4 2250 1000 4500 50 1500 1830
35 0.5 2250 1000 4500 50 1625 2275
36 0.6 2250 1000 4500 50 1750 2720
37 0.7 2250 1000 4500 50 1875 3165
38 0.8 2250 1000 4500 50 2000 3610
39 0.9 2250 1000 4500 50 2125 4055
40 1 2250 1000 4500 50 2250 4500
In Table A2 the parameters are (1) the horizon in months, (2) the task number in sequence if
this horizon was selected for the subject to make choices over, (3) the principal of 3000 kroner if the
subject had the “higher stakes” condition, (4) the principal of 1500 kroner if the subject had the
“lower stakes” condition, (5) the annual interest rate presented to the subject if that treatment was
applied (this is also the annual effective rate with annual compounding), (6) the delayed payment if
the subject had the “higher stakes” condition, (7) the delayed payment if the subject had the “lower
stakes” condition, (8) the implied annual effective rate with quarterly compounding, and (9) the
implied annual effective rate with daily compounding. The values in columns (8) and (9) were not
presented to subjects.
Table A2: Parameters for Discounting Choices
 
Horizon
in
months Task
Principal
in high
stakes
Principal
if low
stakes
Annual
Interest
Rate
Delayed
Payment
if low stakes
Delayed
Payment
if high stakes
AER
Quarterly
AER
Daily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.5 1 3000 1500 5% 3006.10 1503.05 5.1% 5.1%
0.5 2 3000 1500 10% 3011.94 1505.97 10.4% 10.5%
0.5 3 3000 1500 15% 3017.52 1508.76 15.9% 16.2%
0.5 4 3000 1500 20% 3022.88 1511.44 21.6% 22.1%
0.5 5 3000 1500 25% 3028.02 1514.01 27.4% 28.4%
0.5 6 3000 1500 30% 3032.98 1516.49 33.5% 35.0%
0.5 7 3000 1500 35% 3037.75 1518.87 39.9% 41.9%
0.5 8 3000 1500 40% 3042.36 1521.18 46.4% 49.1%
0.5 9 3000 1500 45% 3046.81 1523.40 53.2% 56.8%
0.5 10 3000 1500 50% 3051.11 1525.56 60.2% 64.8%
1 1 3000 1500 5% 3012.22 1506.11 5.1% 5.1%
1 2 3000 1500 10% 3023.92 1511.96 10.4% 10.5%
1 3 3000 1500 15% 3035.14 1517.57 15.9% 16.2%
1 4 3000 1500 20% 3045.93 1522.96 21.6% 22.1%
1 5 3000 1500 25% 3056.31 1528.15 27.4% 28.4%
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1 6 3000 1500 30% 3066.31 1533.16 33.5% 35.0%
1 7 3000 1500 35% 3075.97 1537.99 39.9% 41.9%
1 8 3000 1500 40% 3085.31 1542.65 46.4% 49.1%
1 9 3000 1500 45% 3094.34 1547.17 53.2% 56.8%
1 10 3000 1500 50% 3103.10 1551.55 60.2% 64.8%
2 1 3000 1500 5% 3024.49 1512.25 5.1% 5.1%
2 2 3000 1500 10% 3048.04 1524.02 10.4% 10.5%
2 3 3000 1500 15% 3070.70 1535.35 15.9% 16.2%
2 4 3000 1500 20% 3092.56 1546.28 21.6% 22.1%
2 5 3000 1500 25% 3113.67 1556.84 27.4% 28.4%
2 6 3000 1500 30% 3134.09 1567.05 33.5% 35.0%
2 7 3000 1500 35% 3153.87 1576.93 39.9% 41.9%
2 8 3000 1500 40% 3173.04 1586.52 46.4% 49.1%
2 9 3000 1500 45% 3191.65 1595.83 53.2% 56.8%
2 10 3000 1500 50% 3209.74 1604.87 60.2% 64.8%
3 1 3000 1500 5% 3036.82 1518.41 5.1% 5.1%
3 2 3000 1500 10% 3072.34 1536.17 10.4% 10.5%
3 3 3000 1500 15% 3106.67 1553.34 15.9% 16.2%
3 4 3000 1500 20% 3139.91 1569.95 21.6% 22.1%
3 5 3000 1500 25% 3172.11 1586.06 27.4% 28.4%
3 6 3000 1500 30% 3203.37 1601.68 33.5% 35.0%
3 7 3000 1500 35% 3233.74 1616.87 39.9% 41.9%
3 8 3000 1500 40% 3263.27 1631.64 46.4% 49.1%
3 9 3000 1500 45% 3292.03 1646.01 53.2% 56.8%
3 10 3000 1500 50% 3320.05 1660.02 60.2% 64.8%
4 1 3000 1500 5% 3049.19 1524.59 5.1% 5.1%
4 2 3000 1500 10% 3096.84 1548.42 10.4% 10.5%
4 3 3000 1500 15% 3143.07 1571.53 15.9% 16.2%
4 4 3000 1500 20% 3187.98 1593.99 21.6% 22.1%
4 5 3000 1500 25% 3231.65 1615.83 27.4% 28.4%
4 6 3000 1500 30% 3274.18 1637.09 33.5% 35.0%
4 7 3000 1500 35% 3315.63 1657.81 39.9% 41.9%
4 8 3000 1500 40% 3356.07 1678.03 46.4% 49.1%
4 9 3000 1500 45% 3395.55 1697.78 53.2% 56.8%
4 10 3000 1500 50% 3434.14 1717.07 60.2% 64.8%
5 1 3000 1500 5% 3061.61 1530.81 5.1% 5.1%
5 2 3000 1500 10% 3121.53 1560.77 10.4% 10.5%
5 3 3000 1500 15% 3179.89 1589.94 15.9% 16.2%
5 4 3000 1500 20% 3236.78 1618.39 21.6% 22.1%
5 5 3000 1500 25% 3292.31 1646.15 27.4% 28.4%
5 6 3000 1500 30% 3346.55 1673.28 33.5% 35.0%
5 7 3000 1500 35% 3399.59 1699.80 39.9% 41.9%
5 8 3000 1500 40% 3451.50 1725.75 46.4% 49.1%
5 9 3000 1500 45% 3502.34 1751.17 53.2% 56.8%
5 10 3000 1500 50% 3552.16 1776.08 60.2% 64.8%
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6 1 3000 1500 5% 3074.09 1537.04 5.1% 5.1%
6 2 3000 1500 10% 3146.43 1573.21 10.4% 10.5%
6 3 3000 1500 15% 3217.14 1608.57 15.9% 16.2%
6 4 3000 1500 20% 3286.34 1643.17 21.6% 22.1%
6 5 3000 1500 25% 3354.10 1677.05 27.4% 28.4%
6 6 3000 1500 30% 3420.53 1710.26 33.5% 35.0%
6 7 3000 1500 35% 3485.69 1742.84 39.9% 41.9%
6 8 3000 1500 40% 3549.65 1774.82 46.4% 49.1%
6 9 3000 1500 45% 3612.48 1806.24 53.2% 56.8%
6 10 3000 1500 50% 3674.23 1837.12 60.2% 64.8%
7 1 3000 1500 5% 3086.61 1543.30 5.1% 5.1%
7 2 3000 1500 10% 3171.52 1585.76 10.4% 10.5%
7 3 3000 1500 15% 3254.83 1627.42 15.9% 16.2%
7 4 3000 1500 20% 3336.65 1668.32 21.6% 22.1%
7 5 3000 1500 25% 3417.06 1708.53 27.4% 28.4%
7 6 3000 1500 30% 3496.14 1748.07 33.5% 35.0%
7 7 3000 1500 35% 3573.96 1786.98 39.9% 41.9%
7 8 3000 1500 40% 3650.59 1825.29 46.4% 49.1%
7 9 3000 1500 45% 3726.08 1863.04 53.2% 56.8%
7 10 3000 1500 50% 3800.50 1900.25 60.2% 64.8%
8 1 3000 1500 5% 3099.18 1549.59 5.1% 5.1%
8 2 3000 1500 10% 3196.81 1598.40 10.4% 10.5%
8 3 3000 1500 15% 3292.96 1646.48 15.9% 16.2%
8 4 3000 1500 20% 3387.73 1693.86 21.6% 22.1%
8 5 3000 1500 25% 3481.19 1740.60 27.4% 28.4%
8 6 3000 1500 30% 3573.42 1786.71 33.5% 35.0%
8 7 3000 1500 35% 3664.46 1832.23 39.9% 41.9%
8 8 3000 1500 40% 3754.39 1877.20 46.4% 49.1%
8 9 3000 1500 45% 3843.26 1921.63 53.2% 56.8%
8 10 3000 1500 50% 3931.11 1965.56 60.2% 64.8%
9 1 3000 1500 5% 3111.81 1555.91 5.1% 5.1%
9 2 3000 1500 10% 3222.30 1611.15 10.4% 10.5%
9 3 3000 1500 15% 3331.54 1665.77 15.9% 16.2%
9 4 3000 1500 20% 3439.59 1719.80 21.6% 22.1%
9 5 3000 1500 25% 3546.53 1773.27 27.4% 28.4%
9 6 3000 1500 30% 3652.40 1826.20 33.5% 35.0%
9 7 3000 1500 35% 3757.26 1878.63 39.9% 41.9%
9 8 3000 1500 40% 3861.16 1930.58 46.4% 49.1%
9 9 3000 1500 45% 3964.12 1982.06 53.2% 56.8%
9 10 3000 1500 50% 4066.21 2033.10 60.2% 64.8%
11 1 3000 1500 5% 3137.22 1568.61 5.1% 5.1%
11 2 3000 1500 10% 3273.89 1636.95 10.4% 10.5%
11 3 3000 1500 15% 3410.05 1705.03 15.9% 16.2%
11 4 3000 1500 20% 3545.72 1772.86 21.6% 22.1%
11 5 3000 1500 25% 3680.91 1840.46 27.4% 28.4%
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11 6 3000 1500 30% 3815.66 1907.83 33.5% 35.0%
11 7 3000 1500 35% 3949.97 1974.99 39.9% 41.9%
11 8 3000 1500 40% 4083.87 2041.94 46.4% 49.1%
11 9 3000 1500 45% 4217.37 2108.69 53.2% 56.8%
11 10 3000 1500 50% 4350.49 2175.25 60.2% 64.8%
12 1 3000 1500 5% 3150 1575 5.1% 5.1%
12 2 3000 1500 10% 3300 1650 10.4% 10.5%
12 3 3000 1500 15% 3450 1725 15.9% 16.2%
12 4 3000 1500 20% 3600 1800 21.6% 22.1%
12 5 3000 1500 25% 3750 1875 27.4% 28.4%
12 6 3000 1500 30% 3900 1950 33.5% 35.0%
12 7 3000 1500 35% 4050 2025 39.9% 41.9%
12 8 3000 1500 40% 4200 2100 46.4% 49.1%
12 9 3000 1500 45% 4350 2175 53.2% 56.8%
12 10 3000 1500 50% 4500 2250 60.2% 64.8%
In Table A3 we present the parameters for one subject. Recall that we define the
lottery " as a 50:50 mixture of {x, Y} and {X, y}, and the lottery $ as a 50:50 mixture of {x,
y} and {X, Y}. So " is a 50:50 mixture of bad and good outcomes in time t and t+J, and
good and bad outcomes in the two time periods; and $ is a 50:50 mixture of all-bad outcomes
and all-good outcomes in the two time periods. In the screen image shown above lottery " is
Option A, and lottery $ is Option B. These parameters in Table A3 are (1) the decision
number, (2) the probability for lottery ", (3) the low amount in kroner, (4) the high amount in
kroner, (5) the front end delay in months for the sooner option, and (6) the horizon in
months for the later option. The sooner option was for delivery in either 1 month, as shown
here for this subject, or in the present. The later option was for delivery in the number of
months shown in (6) after the front end delay. So for this subject decision #1 would have a
later delivery time 9 months beyond the present. If this subject had not had a front end delay
for the sooner option, the later option for decision #1 would have been 8 months from the
present.
Table A3: Parameters for Intertemporal Lottery Choices
 
Decision
Probability
for Lottery "
Low Prize
(kroner)
High Prize
(kroner)
Front End Delay
(months)
Horizon
(months)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 0.1 50 4500 1 8
2 0.2 50 4500 1 8
3 0.3 50 4500 1 8
4 0.4 50 4500 1 8
5 0.5 50 4500 1 8
6 0.6 50 4500 1 8
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7 0.7 50 4500 1 8
8 0.8 50 4500 1 8
9 0.9 50 4500 1 8
10 1 50 4500 1 8
11 0.1 50 4500 1 7
12 0.2 50 4500 1 7
13 0.3 50 4500 1 7
14 0.4 50 4500 1 7
15 0.5 50 4500 1 7
16 0.6 50 4500 1 7
17 0.7 50 4500 1 7
18 0.8 50 4500 1 7
19 0.9 50 4500 1 7
20 1 50 4500 1 7
21 0.1 50 4500 1 4
22 0.2 50 4500 1 4
23 0.3 50 4500 1 4
24 0.4 50 4500 1 4
25 0.5 50 4500 1 4
26 0.6 50 4500 1 4
27 0.7 50 4500 1 4
28 0.8 50 4500 1 4
29 0.9 50 4500 1 4
30 1 50 4500 1 4
31 0.1 50 4500 1 1
32 0.2 50 4500 1 1
33 0.3 50 4500 1 1
34 0.4 50 4500 1 1
35 0.5 50 4500 1 1
36 0.6 50 4500 1 1
37 0.7 50 4500 1 1
38 0.8 50 4500 1 1
39 0.9 50 4500 1 1
40 1 50 4500 1 1
29 Specifically, if the individual has completed vocational education and training or “short-cycle”
higher education. Danes commonly refer to the cycle of education in this manner: most short-cycle higher
education programs last for less than 2 years; medium-cycle higher education lasts for 3 to 4 years, and
includes training for occupations such as a journalist, primary or lower secondary school teacher, nursery and
kindergarten teacher, and ordinary nurse; long-cycle higher education typically lasts 5 years and is offered at
Denmark’s five ordinary universities, at the business schools and various other advanced institutions.
30 Specifically, the completion of medium-cycle or longer-cycle higher education.
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Appendix B: Estimates with Covariates (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Table B1 extends the maximum likelihood estimates by including covariates for each
of the core structural parameters to reflect observable heterogeneity in responses. We include
covariates for individual demographic characteristics as well as task characteristics. Unless
otherwise noted, all variables are binary.
Variable FEMALE indicates a female; YOUNG is someone aged less than 30;
MIDDLE is someone aged between 40 and 50; OLD is someone aged over 50 (so the
omitted age category are those aged between 30 and 39); SINGLE is someone who lives
without a spouse or partner; KIDS is someone who has children; OWNER is someone who
owns their apartment or house; RETIRED is someone who is retired; STUDENT is
someone who is a student; SKILLED is someone with some post-secondary education29;
LONGEDU is someone who has substantial higher education30; INCLOW is someone with
household income in 2009 below 300,000 kroner; and INCHIGH is someone with household
income in 2009 of 500,000 kroner or more.
Turning to the task treatments, variable RA_FIRST indicates if the risk aversion task
was presented before the discounting task; and FEE_HIGH indicates if the higher show-up
fee of 500 kroner was used to recruit the subject (rather than 300 kroner); RAHIGH indicates
if the two highest prize sets in the atemporal risk aversion tasks were used; FED indicates if a
30-day front end delay was employed for the “sooner” option; IDRORDER indicates if the
subject was presented the horizons in increasing order (rather than decreasing order);
IDRHIGH indicates if the higher principal of 3000 kroner was used (rather than 1500
kroner); INFO indicates if information on implied interest rates was provided, and
IRAHIGH indicates if the two highest prize sets in the inter-temporal risk aversion tasks
were used.
The results in Table B1 display considerable homogeneity in the elicited parameters
across the subjects in the sample. Implied values of RRA and IES are also reported in Table
B2. We find that only one of the demographic characteristics is significantly correlated with
variations in the core parameters across subjects. Women appear to have a higher estimated a-
tenmporal risk attitudes (r) than men, with an estimated marginal effect of 0.22 that is
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.025. There is no significant effect from sex on the
elicited intertemporal risk attitudes (0) or on individual discount rates (*).
The results also show that there are no significant effects of task characteristics on the
estimated core parameters in the model. The absence of treatment effects on the curvature of
the atemporal utility function and individual discount rates are noteworthy, since several of
our treatments have been found to have significant effects on behavior in studies that used
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related experimental and survey methods. In particular, we do not find a significant effect
from varying the stakes in the atemporal risk aversion task or in the discount rate task, and
individual discount rates do not vary significantly with the delay to the sooner payment option
or information on implied interest rates by choosing the later payment option.
We can also evaluate the total effects of several of the demographic characteristics on
the estimated RRA and IES, by estimating marginal effects without controls for other
characteristics. We calculate total effects since many demographic characteristics co-vary in
the population and therefore also in our sample. For example, the men in our sample have a
number of characteristics that differ from the women apart from sex. By not controlling for
these other characteristics of men, we can estimate the difference in RRA and IES between
men and women that jointly reflects all of these differences.  To consider the total effects, we
simply repeat the statistical analysis shown in Table B1 but with only one demographic
characteristic included at a time. In this manner our estimates include all of the demographic
characteristics correlated with the characteristic of interest. The maximum likelihood
estimates of RRA and IES for a selection of demographic characteristics are displayed in
Table B3.
We find that women are more risk averse than men with an estimated RRA of 0.75
for women and 0.50 for men. This difference in RRA between men and women is statistically
significant with a p-value of 0.005. The results also show that men have a higher IES than
women. The estimated coefficient for men is 2.56 and is 1.71 for women, and the difference
of 0.85 is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.006. We do not find any significant
variation in the estimated RRA and IES coefficients for the other individual characteristics
that are included in Table B3. Hence we can not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of
RRA and IES are similar across age groups. Subjects between 30 and 40 years of age appear
to be more risk averse than other age groups, but the estimated RRA coefficients for the four
age groups are jointly insignificant with a p-value of 0.94. The results also point to a lower
IES coefficient for subjects older than 50 years of age compared to younger age groups,
however the variation in estimated IES coefficients is statistically insignificant (p-value of
0.51). Finally, the results show no significant variation in estimated RRA and IES coefficients
across educational levels and income groups. 
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Table B1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates with Covariates
N=49,560 observations, based on 413 subjects
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Atemporal Utility Function (r)
Constant
RAfirst
FEEhigh
RAhigh
Female
Young
Middle
Old
Single
Kids
Owner
Retired
Student
Skilled
Longedu
IncLow
IncHigh
 0.43
-0.01
 0.09
 0.06
 0.22
-0.09
-0.03
 0.04
-0.04
-0.10
 0.08
-0.05
-0.25
-0.10
-0.01
 0.13
-0.05
0.243
0.102
0.093
0.073
0.010
0.213
0.113
0.156
0.099
0.135
0.089
0.114
0.133
0.193
0.194
0.137
0.081
0.074
0.895
0.325
0.444
0.025
0.678
0.764
0.818
0.669
0.455
0.387
0.629
0.063
0.603
0.941
0.346
0.518
-0.04
-0.21
-0.09
-0.09
 0.03
-0.51
-0.26
-0.27
-0.24
-0.36
-0.10
-0.28
-0.51
-0.48
-0.39
-0.14
-0.21
0.91
0.19
0.27
0.20
0.42
0.33
0.19
0.34
0.15
0.16
0.25
0.17
0.01
0.28
0.37
0.40
0.11
: 0.18 0.013 <0.001 0.15 0.2
Discounting Function (*) 
Constant
RAfirst
FEEhigh
FED
IDRorder
IDRhigh
INFO
Female
Young
Middle
Old
Single
Kids
Owner
Retired
Student
Skilled
Longedu
IncLow
IncHigh
 0.113
 0.015
-0.026
 0.018
-0.044
 0.012
-0.035
-0.051
 0.032
-0.001
-0.016
 0.027
 0.052
-0.037
 0.021
 0.112
 0.032
 0.003
-0.025
 0.016
0.080
0.035
0.028
0.022
0.027
0.022
0.026
0.038
0.060
0.039
0.051
0.055
0.048
0.032
0.059
0.091
0.063
0.060
0.053
0.034
0.155
0.674
0.361
0.416
0.193
0.590
0.168
0.185
0.597
0.973
0.751
0.622
0.270
0.254
0.716
0.220
0.608
0.963
0.632
0.651
-0.04
-0.05
-0.08
-0.03
-0.09
-0.03
-0.09
-0.13
-0.09
-0.08
-0.12
-0.08
-0.04
-0.10
-0.09
-0.07
-0.09
-0.11
-0.13
-0.05
0.27
0.08
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.15
0.08
0.08
0.14
0.15
0.03
0.14
0.29
0.16
0.12
0.08
0.08
:N 0.12 0.011 <0.001 0.1 0.14
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Intertemporal Utility Function (0)
Constant
RAfirst
FEEhigh
FED
IDRorder
IRAhigh
Female
Young
Middle
Old
Single
Kids
Owner
Retired
Student
Skilled
Longedu
IncLow
IncHigh
 0.81
-0.03
 0.05
-0.01
 0.03
-0.10
 0.15
-0.32
-0.18
-0.49
-0.28
-0.23
 0.02
-0.23
-0.18
-0.19
-0.07
 0.15
 0.09
0.563
0.164
0.123
0.106
0.083
0.267
0.431
0.407
0.569
0.380
0.800
0.326
0.138
0.629
0.606
0.463
0.283
0.462
0.205
0.150
0.856
0.708
0.929
0.682
0.707
0.721
0.431
0.751
0.201
0.730
0.490
0.856
0.709
0.766
0.688
0.794
0.742
0.665
-0.29
-0.35
-0.19
-0.22
-0.13
-0.62
-0.69
-1.12
-1.29
-1.23
-1.84
-0.86
-0.24
-1.47
-1.37
-1.09
-0.63
-0.75
-0.31
1.92
0.29
0.29
0.20
0.20
0.42
1.00
0.48
0.93
0.26
1.29
0.41
0.29
1.00
1.01
0.72
0.48
1.06
0.49
:O 0.18 0.01 <0.001 0.16 0.2
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Table B2: Implied Maximum Likelihood Estimates
N=49,560 observations, based on 413 subjects
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Relative Risk Aversion
Constant
RAfirst
FEEhigh
RAhigh
FED
IDRorder
IRAhigh
Female
Young
Middle
Old
Single
Kids
Owner
Retired
Student
Skilled
Longedu
IncLow
IncHigh
 0.66
-0.02
 0.07
 0.03
 0.00
 0.01
-0.03
 0.16
-0.16
-0.07
-0.11
-0.11
-0.13
 0.05
-0.11
-0.22
-0.12
-0.03
 0.11
 0.00
0.290
0.102
0.072
0.036
0.030
0.025
0.086
0.174
0.227
0.234
0.135
0.333
0.154
0.077
0.267
0.284
0.239
0.189
0.208
0.071
0.022
0.870
0.364
0.365
0.929
0.700
0.742
0.360
0.488
0.751
0.424
0.743
0.383
0.500
0.692
0.439
0.612
0.874
0.597
0.959
 0.09
-0.22
-0.08
-0.04
-0.06
-0.04
-0.20
-0.18
-0.60
-0.53
-0.37
-0.76
-0.44
-0.10
-0.63
-0.78
-0.59
-0.40
-0.30
-0.14
1.23
0.18
0.21
0.10
0.06
0.06
0.14
0.50
0.29
0.38
0.16
0.54
0.17
0.20
0.42
0.34
0.35
0.34
0.52
0.14
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Constant
RAfirst
FEEhigh
RAhigh
Female
Young
Middle
Old
Single
Kids
Owner
Retired
Student
Skilled
Longedu
IncLow
IncHigh
 2.30
 0.07
-0.40
-0.26
-0.78
 0.59
 0.20
-0.18
 0.25
 0.69
-0.35
 0.33
 3.04
 0.69
 0.08
-0.53
 0.31
1.289
0.546
0.479
0.362
0.863
1.212
0.745
0.859
0.824
0.838
0.456
0.858
4.053
1.190
1.037
0.869
0.707
0.074
0.892
0.405
0.470
0.365
0.627
0.792
0.838
0.763
0.408
0.445
0.697
0.453
0.561
0.940
0.543
0.656
-0.22
-1.00
-1.34
-0.97
-2.47
-1.79
-1.26
-1.86
-1.37
-0.95
-1.24
-1.35
-4.90
-1.64
-1.95
-2.23
-1.07
 4.83
 1.14
 0.54
 0.45
 0.91
 2.96
 1.66
 1.51
 1.86
 2.34
 0.55
 2.01
10.99
 3.02
 2.11
 1.17
 1.70
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Table B3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Total Effects
N=49,560 observations, based on 413 subjects
Standard
Variable Estimate Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Relative Risk Aversion
Female 0.75 0.069 <0.001 0.61 0.89
Male 0.50 0.100 <0.001 0.29 0.70
Young 0.58 0.098 <0.001 0.39 0.78
Adult 0.66 0.114 <0.001 0.44 0.88
Middle 0.57 0.164 0.001 0.25 0.89
Old 0.58 0.106 <0.001 0.37 0.79
Unskilled 0.60 0.131 <0.001 0.34 0.85
Skilled 0.57 0.120 <0.001 0.34 0.81
Longedu 0.63 0.082 <0.001 0.47 0.79
IncLow 0.66 0.097 <0.001 0.47 0.85
IncMiddle 0.58 0.115 <0.001 0.35 0.81
IncHigh 0.56 0.138 <0.001 0.29 0.83
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Female 1.71 0.188 <0.001 1.34 2.08
Male 2.56 0.360 <0.001 1.85 3.26
Young 2.47 0.409 <0.001 1.67 3.27
Adult 2.20 0.411 <0.001 1.40 3.01
Middle 2.39 0.602 <0.001 1.21 3.57
Old 1.97 0.260 <0.001 1.46 2.48
Unskilled 2.17 0.415 <0.001 1.36 2.99
Skilled 2.26 0.395 <0.001 1.49 3.04
Longedu 2.01 0.247 <0.001 1.52 2.49
IncLow 1.93 0.283 <0.001 1.37 2.48
IncMiddle 2.01 0.301 <0.001 1.42 2.61
IncHigh 2.37 0.446 <0.001 1.50 3.25
